Abstract-Liquidity in the National Balancing Point (NBP) forward market during 2010-14 is examined using liquidity measures adopted from the financial literature. Since the sample period includes the date when the EU Regulation on Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) became in force, the question of whether changes in these measures reflect REMIT is also investigated. There is evidence of increased market transparency and competition, but no significant differences in the level of liquidity in the NBP one-month-ahead market appear to have followed the introduction of REMIT.
INTRODUCTION
Following the liberalization and development of natural gas trading hubs in Europe, forward products have become a response to the increased exposure to price risk that energy companies face in the spot market. Financial institutions and non-physical traders were encouraged to participate in the European natural gas market, and have further contributed to the development of trading hubs. Yet, concerns over the impact of investors on market quality have been raised, mainly when trading occurs in the less transparent over-the-counter (OTC) markets [1] - [5] . To foster stability and transparency, the European Commission has introduced several regulatory proposals. Among these introductions, is Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011 on wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), which has been in force since December 2011, and became effective on 7 October 2015. Wholesale markets encompass both commodity and derivatives, which are either physically or financially settled. REMIT introduces a monitoring framework to detect and prevent market abuse, particularly in the OTC market. Monitoring requires regular and timely access to records of transactions, as well as data on capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural gas. Market participants, including transmission system operators, suppliers, traders, producers, brokers and large consumers, who trade wholesale energy products, are required to provide this comprehensive set of information to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, which will then ensure that prices are fair and that no profits can be drawn from market abuse. Although higher transparency can reduce transaction costs and lower barriers to market entry, and thus improve liquidity [6] [7], REMIT's effects on market quality and, specifically on liquidity, are unknown. For example, large commercial participants (e.g. energy companies) may be more knowledgeable about retail market developments and reluctant to post orders that could give away their informative advantage. This could lead to a deterioration of liquidity [8] and higher market entry barriers for smaller players, thus compromising competitiveness, investment decisions and market efficiency. Moreover, the amount of reporting poses high administrative costs on market participants that may increase rather than reduce transaction costs, thus making the markets less attractive. Reduced trading activity from investors could decrease liquidity and lead to market instability. Hence, measuring liquidity is relevant to cost the hedging, undertake investment decisions, and to aid regulators and policy makers in monitoring market quality, especially in the context of the evolving liberalized European energy markets. The aim of the present study is to assess liquidity in the NBP forward market, which is the main pricing hub in Europe [9] [10] and can be regarded as representative of the European natural gas market. Several measures of liquidity that are borrowed from the financial literature and were inspired by microstructure theory, e.g. [11] , are used. A time-varying setting is adopted, in order to investigate changes in liquidity that may have followed the introduction of REMIT. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, the liquidity measures in energy and financial markets are reviewed. Section III describes the data and methods. The empirical results are reported in Section IV. Finally, Section V discusses the main findings and their implications.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Liquidity is a measure of market quality, which can be defined as the ability to match buyers and sellers at the lowest transaction cost [11] . According to this definition, when examining liquidity the focus should be on trading 978-1-5090-1298-5/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE mechanisms and the evolution of asset pricing in the markets. Higher transactions costs imply lower asset prices and higher rate of returns, required to compensate investors for bearing the liquidity cost. This aspect has been extensively investigated in the financial literature, e.g. [12] - [16] , and denotes the ability of a market to offer sufficient opportunities for trading, such that individual trades have a limited impact on market prices. A lack of liquidity may impede trading, thereby making it easier for one market player to assume a dominant position, with implications for price fluctuations. Practitioners in natural gas and power markets usually refer to the churn ratio as measure of liquidity, e.g. [17] . This measure is the ratio of the trading volumes to the physical deliveries after trades: the higher this ratio, the greater is the market liquidity. Although simple to calculate and useful when comparing markets, the churn ratio is driven by physical deliveries which, in natural gas markets, are seasonal and weather-dependent. Furthermore, it encompasses trading activity, which may be associated with higher volatility, thus implying lower liquidity [18] [19] . A rigorous and empirically relevant measure of liquidity in energy economics remains a challenge, mainly due to the multiple dimensions involved. Liquidity comprises important transactional properties of a market such as tightness (the cost of turning around a position over a short period), depth (the size of an order flow innovation required to change price of a given amount), and resiliency (the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock) [20] . In common, these properties define liquidity as a transaction cost. However, there is no consensus on which would be the best measure to capture this cost. In the financial literature, different measures of spread and price impact have been proposed to assess market liquidity, e.g. [14] [21].
Measures of spread
Spread is a proxy for tightness. Commonly used measures are the quoted bid-ask spread and the effective spread [22] - [26] . They originate from a microstructure model where costumers trade only with market-makers, with bid-ask midpoint (midquote) from the most recent best bid and ask centered, on average, on the fair asset value, [24] [26] [27] . The quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the most recent best ask and bid quotes. It represents the cost of a "round trip", which is a purchase followed by a sale for small quantities.
Stoll [28] observed that quoted bid-ask spreads may overstate transaction costs, because either traders are better informed than the market-makers, or market-makers adjust the bid-ask spread to control for their inventory. In this respect, the effective spread, which is defined as the difference between execution prices and mid-quotes, is an estimate of the actual transaction cost since it recognizes that trades may occur at prices other than the mid-quotes. The realized spread is similarly defined, but refers to the actual spread which follows a trade. It represents the noninformational component of the effective spread, which should lead to a temporary deviation of the price from the underlying value, as measured by the price reversal immediately after a trade, e.g. [24] . [32] - [34] , and in the Nordic power market by [35] .
Measures of price impact
In a high-frequency setting, measures of price impact are used to evaluate two aspects of liquidity: depth and resiliency, e.g. [15] [36] . The price impact is defined as the temporary changes in execution prices following an order flow, where the order flow is set as the signed volume [15] . A measure of price impact is "the price change associated with the aggregated signed square-root dollar-volume" over the same time interval [16] . [37] - [39] employed the expected return reversal to measure of price impact. The relationship between price changes and order flow, defined as difference between the numbers of buy and sell initiated trades, was adopted as proxy for price impact by e.g. [40] . In all, there is no consensus on how to assess liquidity, and different measures are explored in this study.
III. DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF LIQUIDITY

MEASURES
The dataset This study uses a unique dataset consisting of tick-by-tick indicative quotes (best ask and best ask), execution prices and volumes from the inter-deal broker Tullett Prebon (http://www.tpinformation.com). One month-ahead forward NBP data for the period May 2010-December 2014 (461,663 records) are available and represent about a third of the total trades in the sample period. Hence, liquidity dynamics are investigated in a particular trading venue. Notwithstanding, the share of the market is not small, and the analysis that follows should be informative with respect to the NBP forward market. As in previous literature, [41] [42], observations outside the interval 7:00-17:00, weekends, holidays, entries with negative spreads and outliers are removed. Simultaneous records at each time t are aggregated according to their medians (quotes and execution prices) and totals (volumes and number of trades). Approximately 2% of the sample is discarded, thus resulting in 78,019 records, which are then resampled at 60-minute-frequency, as in [43] [44], to reduce effects of microstructure noise in high-frequency irregularly spaced time series [45] . The first return of each day is discarded, as it might reflect adjustments to the overnight information. The final sample has 12,870 observations. Given the expected effect of seasonality in the demand for natural gas on quotes and execution prices and volumes, adjustment regressions are performed on the raw series to account for a trend and seasonality [46] .
Assessing liquidity in the NBP forward market
The first measures adopted relate to the spread: the effective half-spread (EHS) and the realized half-spread (RHS), i.e.
where P τ is the execution price at the trading time τ, M τ is the mid-quote at the same time. D τ is the transaction direction indicator taking values 1, for buyer initiated transactions, and -1, for seller-initiated transactions, set according to [47] . The realized half-spread represents the compensation of the risk adverse liquidity supplier for bearing the price risk of an order imbalance [48] . M τ+1 is the mid-quote after the transaction, a proxy for the post-transaction value. The realized half-spread contains the non-informational component of the effective half-spread, i.e. the transaction cost net of the asymmetric information component. The informational, and permanent, component is measured by the price impact of a transaction (PI), defined as:
Effective half-spread, realized half-spread and price impact contribute to explain the costs of a single small transaction. However, liquidity adjusts to the pressure exerted by large transactions, often executed in multiple transactions [16] . In order to investigate this aspect in the NBP forward market, a second measure of price impact, from [16] [20], is adopted:
where r n,t is the return time series over a fixed interval, t = 1,…,T in the rolling window n and S n,t is the sum of the signed square-root of the order flow in the interval and window. The time-varying coefficient, λ n , is estimated assuming rolling windows of size m=4,500 (two business years) over the sample and increments between successive rolling windows of 1 period. This procedure results in 6,031 estimates of the price impact λ (N=T-m+1, with T=12,870). The reciprocal of λ can measure market depth, where a low value of λ implies that prices are less sensitive to order flow.
IV. ESTIMATION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of the daily liquidity measures are shown in Table I . On average, transaction costs in the NBP one month-ahead forward market are 0.312% (EHS), split in 0.171% of RHS and 0.141% PI. This implies that the noninformational component accounts for 55% of the EHS. The t-test computed on the difference between the EHS and PI is significant at 5% significance level. Nonparametric sign tests for the differences between medians and between quartiles of EHS and PI also reject equality. That is, the distributions of EHS and PI are significantly different. Figure 1 depicts the monthly medians of EHS, and suggests a yearly pattern in the one month-ahead NBP forward market liquidity. Figure 2 shows the rolling estimates of the measure of price impact λ and estimated confidence intervals, based on the Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. A gradual decrease in the measure over the period up to March 2014 and an increase in level and variance in the subsequent period are observed. Table III summarizes the distributions of daily liquidity measures in the pre-and post-REMIT periods; t-tests and a nonparametric sign tests on the means and medians, respectively, fail to reject equality in the pre-and post-event samples. One-tail F-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across the two sub-samples for all the liquidity measures. There is higher volatility in EHS and RHS after REMIT. Table IV reports estimates of the price impact measure λ in the pre-and post-REMIT periods. The Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of identical parameters across subsamples. Hence, there is a decrease in the price pressure exerted by the trading activity after REMIT. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
From Table II , the higher and positive correlation between the effective half-spread and the realized half-spread in relation to the price impact measure, PI, suggests that changes in liquidity appear to be more associated with inventory costs than asymmetric information. This result is also supported by the higher and positive correlation between realized halfspread and trading activity. Hence, factors influencing inventory risk and order imbalances play an important role in explaining liquidity in the NBP forward market, with implications for hedging decisions likewise inventory decisions and storage value, being the natural gas a storable commodity. It also appears that higher trading activity reduces liquidity in the one-month ahead NBP forward market. One possible interpretation of this finding would be that trading activity reduces dealers' inventory positions, thus increasing the cost of immediacy. This would be in line with the estimates of price impact, λ, which show a positive association between one-month ahead forward price returns and order flow in the NBP, thus corroborating previous findings from financial markets, e.g. [40] . Thus, the gradual decrease in this association over the period 2010-13 would imply lower immediacy cost and greater depth and resilience in the onemonth ahead NBP forward market, possibly driven by lower demand and high inventory, which reduced trading activity in the period. During 2013-14, NBP saw a drop in physical deliveries, in favor of the TTF hub [49] and a progressive shift of traders from the OTC to exchanges. Thus, in 2014, the premium of oil-linked contracts over hub prices in Continental Europe was a strong incentive for buyers to buy from hubs, in anticipation of higher volumes to be taken at lower oilindexed prices, following the drop in oil-prices (July 2014). This likely behavior together with the gradual exit of investors from the commodities markets, observed since 2013, might have contributed to increase price pressure, and in turn to reduce liquidity during the second half of 2014.
No evidence of significant changes in liquidity after REMIT is found in the data, thus implying neither deterioration nor improvement in the competitiveness and efficiency of the onemonth NBP forward market. However, the measures of spread and price impact indicate higher volatility since REMIT. Although increases in volatility may be reasonably explained by the decrease in the trading activity over the period, it may also reflect the lower frequency of investors in the market. Higher administrative costs may not have affected liquidity directly, but may have increased its variability. The findings of this study are limited to the share of market here analyzed. Furthermore, the dataset does not discriminate between commercial and financial investors, thus the impact of REMIT on different trade types cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, the present study illustrates the usefulness of liquidity measures from financial markets to describe changes in liquidity in physical markets, in particular, natural gas markets. In this respect, the price impact measure, λ, has helped to link trading activity to price returns, thus enabling the assessment of the depth and resilience of the one-month ahead NB forward market. Such aspects cannot be captured by the churn ratio, thus making this measure valuable to regulators when monitoring EU market quality, mainly after the disclosure of transaction data following REMIT.
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